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DISFLUENCY AND DECEPTION 2
Abstract
A speaker’s manner of delivery of an utterance can affect a listener’s pragmatic
interpretation of the message. Disfluencies (such as filled pauses) influence a listener’s
off-line assessment of whether the speaker is truthful or deceptive. Do listeners also form
this assessment during the moment-by-moment processing of the linguistic message? Here
we present two experiments that examined listeners’ judgment of whether a speaker was
indicating the true location of the prize in a game during fluent and disfluent utterances.
Participants’ eye and mouse movements were biased toward the location named by the
speaker during fluent utterances, whereas the opposite bias was observed during disfluent
utterances. This difference emerged rapidly after the onset of the critical noun.
Participants were similarly sensitive to disfluencies at the start of the utterance
(Experiment 1) and in the middle (Experiment 2). Our findings support recent research
showing that listeners integrate pragmatic information alongside semantic content during
the earliest moments of language processing. Unlike prior work which has focused on
pragmatic effects in the interpretation of the literal message, here we highlight
disfluency’s role in guiding a listener to an alternative non-literal message.
Keywords: Psychology; Language understanding; Pragmatics
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Effects of Disfluency in Online Interpretation of Deception
Introduction
In interpreting an utterance, listeners must often take into account not only what is
said, but how it is being said, because the manner of production may in turn be relevant
to the interpretation of meaning. For instance, a speaker may place a prosodic contour on
a statement to emphasize a point (Fernald & Mazzie, 1991), or they may preface their
utterance with an “um” to express a lack of certainty (Smith & Clark, 1993). Such
paralinguistic features encoded within the speech signal are known to influence listeners’
pragmatic interpretations of the linguistic message. In their study on the perception of
speaker confidence, Brennan and Williams (1995) observed that utterances produced with
rising intonation, temporal delays, and filled pauses such as “uh” or “um” were judged to
be less confident, showing that the manner of delivery of an utterance provides cues that
influence a listener’s estimation of the speaker’s metacognitive state. Brennan and
Williams’ (1995) findings have since been extended to a variety of contexts, such as the
assessment of a speaker’s certainty (Swerts & Krahmer, 2005), by both adult and child
judges (Krahmer & Swerts, 2005), as well as in machine interpretation of nonspontaneous
speech (Pon-Barry & Shieber, 2011).
Research on the recognition of deception also highlights the perceptual relevance of
paralinguistic information in language comprehension. Studies on lie detection focus on
the interpretation of paralinguistic cues in both auditory and visual modalities. Vocal
cues, such as tone of voice or speech disturbances, appear to be more informative than
visual cues such as facial gestures or body movements. Across an analysis of 50 studies
that manipulated participants’ access to visual and audio information when making
truth-lie judgments, Bond and DePaulo (2006) found that discrimination accuracy was
lower when participants made judgments based on visual information rather than audio or
audiovisual, highlighting the salience of vocal cues in the context of recognizing deception.
Filled pauses, in particular, stand among a set of belief cues that listeners
frequently associate with lie perception. Zuckerman, Koestner, and Driver (1981) found
DISFLUENCY AND DECEPTION 4
that speech hesitations were one of the cues reliably associated with judgment of
lie-telling, whether it was in predicting behavior exhibited by subjects themselves or by
others. This finding corroborates a parallel assessment of the actual cues that listeners
use in detecting deception, where a meta-analysis of 33 studies again implicated filled
pauses as an indicator of deception (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981).
The aforementioned studies thus outline a relationship between a speaker’s manner
of delivery and the listener’s pragmatic interpretation of the speech; however, one
limitation in the existing research is the reliance on off-line measures of judgment. While
the time-course of pragmatic inferencing lies beyond the scope of those studies, off-line
methods are consistent with an implicit assumption that in computing the meaning of an
utterance, contributions made by pragmatic enrichment occur at a relatively late stage of
processing. This is in line with traditional models of language comprehension, which
frequently distinguish between the what and the how of a linguistic message. Under this
view, listeners must first interpret the literal message content before consulting any social
or contextual knowledge that may alter the global meaning of the utterance (Blank, 1988;
Hamblin & Gibbs, 2003; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Lattner & Friederici,
2003). Pragmatic considerations, such as what might be intended by the utterance or
whether the speaker might be lying, thus require additional (and correspondingly
time-consuming) inferential processes before a contextually-appropriate meaning can be
derived (e.g., Blank, 1988).
This temporal prioritization of the literal, however, has not gone unchallenged. A
growing body of research emphasizes the primacy of the communicative aspect of
linguistic exchange (Clark, 1996). Studies on figurative language processing suggest that
people are not necessarily slower in interpreting the figurative meaning of an expression
than the literal (e.g., Blasko & Connine, 1993; Gibbs, 1994; Giora, 1997; see Glucksberg,
2003 for a review). Using a cross-modal priming paradigm, Blasko and Connine (1993)
measured the reaction times for participants making lexical decisions on words that were
literally-related, metaphorically-related or unrelated to the vehicle of a metaphor that
they heard, and showed that people access metaphorical meanings as quickly as the
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literal, even in the case of novel or unfamiliar metaphors such as “her thoughts were a
boiling kettle”. Given adequate contextual information, listeners can comprehend the
intended meaning of non-literal utterances directly without first having to compute and
reject a contextually-incompatible literal interpretation (Gibbs, 1994; cf. Pynte, Besson,
Robichon, & Poli, 1996).
Findings such as these are inconsistent with traditional models, highlighting the
problematic nature of the “literal-first” assumption. On the other hand, their conclusions
converge with several studies examining the time course of pragmatic inferencing which
have found immediate effects of various kinds of contextual constraints on listener
interpretation (e.g., Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003; Hanna
& Tanenhaus, 2004; Van Berkum, van den Brink, Tesink, Kos, & Hagoort, 2008; although
cf. Lattner & Friederici, 2003). For instance, results from event-related brain potentials
(ERPs) reveal that listeners make inferences based on the speaker’s voice, and what it
suggests about age and gender. Evidence for these inferences emerges as early as
200-300 ms from the onset of a critical word, suggesting that pragmatic inferences are
processed by the same early interpretation mechanisms that construct a content-based
literal meaning (Van Berkum et al., 2008). Van Berkum et al. interpret their findings
within a one-step model of language comprehension, where social context is incorporated
immediately and alongside semantic content in the construction of an overall utterance
meaning.
Eye-tracking studies on perspective-taking show that addressees are able to take
into account common ground information available to both themselves and the speaker
from the earliest moments of reference resolution (Hanna et al., 2003; Nadig & Sedivy,
2002). Hanna and Tanenhaus (2004) showed that listeners interpreting an ambiguous
referent were sensitive to the contextual constraint of whether or not the speaker was
physically able to reach the object, with effects emerging rapidly after the onset of the
critical object name. Studies such as these show that listeners are able to rapidly extract
and use pragmatic information based on the speaker’s identity, and based on the
situation that the utterance is produced in; two forms of context to which the listener has
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access prior to and during the entire utterance. Building on this, the experiments
reported here are designed to establish whether listeners make rapid pragmatic inferences
based on the moment-to-moment manner in which an utterance is spoken. Specifically,
we investigate how a listener’s on-line judgment of whether an utterance is a truth or lie
varies with the voice-based cue of utterance fluency, exploiting the well-established
finding which indicates a correlation between disfluencies and lie perception.
To date, the majority of research on the on-line comprehension of disfluencies has
focused on the effect of disfluency on expectations relating to the semantic content of the
message (Arnold, Tanenhaus, Altmann, & Fagnano, 2004; Arnold, Hudson Kam, &
Tanenhaus, 2007; see Arnold & Tanenhaus, 2011 for a review). For instance, Arnold et al.
(2004) showed that eye movements of listeners told to manipulate objects on a visual
display were biased toward either previously-mentioned or discourse-new objects,
depending on whether the instruction contained a disfluency. Listeners hearing “Put the
grapes above the candle. Now put the candle/camel. . . ” were initially more likely to look
at the candle, whereas disfluent instructions such as “Now put thee, uh, candle/camel. . . ”
elicited more looks toward the camel during the temporarily ambiguous onset (“ca. . . ”).
Arnold et al. (2007) later extended this finding to unfamiliar objects perceived as difficult
to describe, by demonstrating that listeners hearing instructions such as “Click on thee,
uh, green. . . ” were initially more likely to look toward green squiggly objects than green
everyday items such as ice cream cones. These studies provide evidence that listeners are
sensitive to the manner of delivery when predicting the upcoming semantic content of the
message; disfluencies create probabilistic expectations about which object a speaker is
likely to refer to out of a given set of possible objects.
In a subsequent experiment, Arnold et al. showed that this semantic effect of
disfluency is modulated by factors such as prior knowledge about the speaker. When they
informed listeners that the speaker giving the instructions had object agnosia, they found
that the tendency to fixate difficult-to-name objects was sharply reduced, highlighting the
context-dependent nature of the disfluency bias (Arnold et al., 2007, Experiment 2). Barr
and Seyfeddinipur (2010) observed a similar effect of disfluency, where listeners’
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content-based predictions were modulated by their inferences relating to the speaker’s
familiarity with the object. Using a mouse-tracking paradigm, they showed that
disfluencies facilitated mouse movements toward a target when described by a speaker
who had not seen the object before, but not during descriptions by a speaker familiar
with the object. These studies show that various forms of contextual information can
influence a listener’s interpretation of disfluency when making on-line predictions about
the message content. However, it remains unclear from the current literature how
disfluencies may affect a listener’s pragmatic hypotheses during the moment-to-moment
processing of the linguistic message itself.
In the current study we aimed to investigate whether, and how, the presence of
disfluency in an utterance influences listeners’ pragmatic inferences relating to the
speaker’s truthfulness during on-line comprehension of the linguistic message (i.e., an
inference about an alternative non-literal message). In the experiments reported here, we
presented a speaker as being sometimes dishonest within a context framed as a lie
detection task. Using a game in which listeners were led to assess whether or not a
speaker was indicating the true location of a reward, we manipulated the speaker’s
manner of delivery (fluent vs. disfluent) to test how this influenced whether or not the
listener believed the utterance. We made use of an eye- and mouse-tracking paradigm to
establish the time course with which these pragmatic inferences are made. In Experiment
1, we used an utterance-initial filled pause to create the disfluent stimuli, in line with
previous studies on manner of delivery (e.g., Brennan & Williams, 1995); in Experiment
2, we explored whether the location of disfluency matters by shifting the disfluency to an
utterance-medial position. As we will show, the results demonstrate that listeners are
influenced by both utterance-initial and utterance-medial disfluencies when making an
implicit judgment on the veracity of the speaker’s utterance. Eye- and mouse-tracking
data also suggest that this inference is made during early moments of utterance
comprehension—during fluent utterances, listeners were quickly biased toward the object
referenced by the speaker, whereas with disfluent utterances they were biased toward the
other object.
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Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to test whether a speaker’s manner of delivery
influences a listener’s interpretation of an utterance as a truth or lie, as well as whether
this judgment is formed during on-line language comprehension. We told participants
that they were taking part in a lie detection study. The experiment was presented in the
format of a computer game, with a series of opportunities for the participant to uncover
hidden treasure behind one of two visible objects on the screen. Participants were told
that the goal was to accumulate treasure by clicking on the object that concealed the
treasure on each trial. Participants heard a recorded speaker reference which object to
click on, but were informed beforehand that the speaker was a participant from an earlier
experiment who had been instructed to lie half the time about the treasure’s location.
This served to establish an element of potential deception in the experiment, as well as to
justify the presence of disfluency in the stimuli. We analyzed the participants’ eye and
mouse movements as well as their object clicks.
Method
Participants. 21 self-reported native speakers of English took part in the
experiment. Participants were all right-handed mouse users with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision.
Materials. Visual stimuli comprised 120 line drawings from Snodgrass and
Vanderwart (1980), presented in pairs across sixty trials (20 critical; 40 filler). For each
pair presented in a visual display, we will use the term referent for the object that the
speaker named as the object concealing the treasure; we will refer to the other object as
the distractor. Critical referents and distractors were matched for ease of naming (H
value < 1.0) and familiarity (≥ 3.5) to minimize participants’ biases toward either object
based on expectations relating to difficulty of description (cf. Arnold et al., 2007).1 Care
1H is a measure of name agreement for a given concept or image, where higher values correspond to
greater difficulty experienced by speakers in naming the object. A description of its derivation can be
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was also taken to ensure both objects did not start with the same sound on critical trials
(cf. Arnold et al., 2004).
Each referent was associated with a recording specifying the image as the object
that the treasure was hidden behind. Critical utterances were either fluent (The treasure
is behind the . . . ) or were preceded by an utterance-initial filled pause (Um, the treasure
is behind the . . . ). The sentences were initially recorded in their entirety; a 400 ms filled
pause from one of the disfluent utterances was then cross-spliced onto the start of each
fluent statement to create a corresponding disfluent version. This ensured that
participants were reacting to the same utterance (bar disfluency manipulation) in each
condition, and to the same disfluency across all disfluent trials.
The 20 experimental referents were counterbalanced across two lists each containing
ten fluent and ten disfluent utterances, such that each referent that occurred within a
fluent utterance in the first list occurred within a disfluent utterance in the second. Each
list included an additional 40 filler utterances, also naming a referent as the object
concealing the treasure. To increase variability, half of these included one of various forms
of disfluency, or a discourse manipulation such as a non-propositional sentence marker or
a modal varying the speaker’s commitment to the truth value of the statement. The
reason for the filler manipulation was twofold: (a) to distract participants from the filled
pause manipulation on critical trials, and (b) to create a set of utterances that closely
approximated natural speech in order to reinforce the cover story which emphasised that
sentences were unscripted. A summary of filler utterance types is provided in Table 1.
The remaining 60 objects served as distractors. These were randomly paired with
referents on each display, with no repetition of images across the experiment.
Procedure. The experiment was presented using OpenSesame version 2.9.4
(Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012) on a 21in. CRT monitor. Eye movements were
monitored using an Eyelink 1000 Tower Mount system which tracked the right eye,
sampling at 500Hz. Mouse coordinates were sampled at 50 Hz.
found in Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980), from which the H values and familiarity ratings reported
here were taken.
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Fig. 1 presents a sample of a trial from the experiment. Between trials, participants
saw a central gray fixation dot and underwent a manual drift correct to ensure accurate
recordings from the eye tracker. After this, the fixation dot turned red for 500 ms to
signify the start of the trial. The dot disappeared and was replaced by two images (a
referent and a distractor), which were centered vertically and positioned horizontally left
and right on the screen. Referents appeared on the left and right side equally often. Each
pair of images appeared for a 1000 ms preview, after which the mouse pointer appeared
at the center of the screen and playback of the audio stimulus began. Participants were
instructed to click on the object which they believed concealed the treasure. Once a
mouse click had been recorded on one of the two objects, the objects disappeared and the
gray fixation dot appeared to begin the next trial, except in the case of fillers which
included feedback (see below). Trials had an automatic time-out 5 seconds post-audio
onset. If a click was not detected before this, participants saw a message telling them to
respond more quickly.
To keep participants motivated, we informed them that the game contained a
number of hidden “bonus” rounds which offered more treasure than the average trial. To
simulate these rounds, 25% of filler trials were programmed to display a message that a
treasure chest had been found regardless of which object was clicked on. This message
appeared immediately following the detection of a mouse click on an object, and
remained on screen until participants clicked again to begin the next trial. Additionally,
participants were told that top scorers would be able to enter their name into the high
score table, which appeared on the screen at the start of the experiment. A 5-trial
practice session preceded the main experiment. One of the practice trials was always set
to display the bonus treasure message. After the task, a post-experiment questionnaire
was used to verify that none of the participants suspected that the audio stimuli
comprised speech that had been scripted for purposes of the experiment.
For each experimental trial, we recorded eye and mouse movements as well as which
object (referent or distractor) the participant clicked on.
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Results
Trials on which a click was not recorded on either object were excluded from
analysis (0.5% of experimental trials). Statistical analyses were carried out in R version
3.1.0 (R Development Core Team, 2015) using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker,
& Walker, 2014). We modelled the binary outcome of final object click in a mixed effect
logistic regression model to test for the main effect of manner of delivery (fluent/disfluent),
including random intercepts and slopes for subject and item random effects. Eye-tracking
records were averaged into 20 ms bins, each comprising ten samples, prior to analysis.
Fixation data were coded in terms of region of interest (referent/distractor/none), and
the proportion of fixations to each object out of the total sum of fixations was computed
for each time bin. Mouse-tracking analysis only took into account the X coordinates. For
each sample, the distance traveled by the mouse was computed by taking the difference
between the X coordinates of the current and previous sample. The data were coded for
direction of movement (toward referent/toward distractor) for each bin, and the
cumulative distance participants had moved the mouse toward either object was
calculated by summing over the distance traveled in each direction up until that time bin
(taking into account all previous mouse movements in that direction on that trial). For
each object, we then calculated a proportion-of-movement measure, defined as the
distance traveled by the mouse pointer towards the given object, divided by the total
distance traveled (regardless of X direction).
In all figures, the proportion of fixations or mouse movements to each object is
plotted from onset of the referent (the point of disambiguation in the utterance) until
2000 ms post-onset, by which point participants had typically moved the mouse over one
of the two objects. Model analyses for eye and mouse movements were conducted over a
time window beginning from referent onset to 800 ms post-onset. This window was
identified based on existing research which suggests listeners’ eye movements establish
reference around 400 to 800 ms after an object is mentioned (Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton,
Sedivy, & Tanenhaus, 1995; Hanna et al., 2003; Tanenhaus, 2007). The window extends
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over the mean duration of critical referents (560 ms) and ends just after offset of the
longest critical referent (776 ms), to minimise possibility of confounding results with any
post-processing effects. Models were estimated using empirical logit regression (Barr,
2008), including time and manner of delivery (fluent/disfluent) as fixed effects, and
random intercepts and random slopes for time in by-subjects and by-items analyses.
Final object click
The distribution of responses suggests an overall tendency to believe the speaker to
be truthful rather than deceptive. Across the experiment, clicks on the referent were
recorded in 58% of trials while clicks on the distractor were recorded in 42% of trials.
Table 2 shows the breakdown of mouse clicks on each object in each condition.
Participants were more likely to click on the referent following a fluent utterance than a
disfluent one, β = 2.30, SE = 0.48, p < .001. Manner of delivery therefore appeared to
influence perception of the speaker’s truthfulness such that participants were more
inclined to interpret a fluent utterance as truthful and a disfluent one as deceptive.
Eye movements
We calculated for each 20 ms time interval the proportion of fixations to each
object, out of the total sum of fixations (including those to areas that constituted neither
object). Fig. 2 shows the proportion of fixations to each object in each condition until
2000 ms post-noun onset. The time course of fixations reveals an effect that emerges
rapidly in the fluent condition, with looks to the referent rising and diverging from the
distractor beginning about 300 ms post-noun onset. In the disfluent condition, we
initially see a rise in looks toward the referent, before an abrupt decrease around 600 ms
post-onset and a corresponding increase in looks to the distractor. The initial rise in
fixations to the referent likely reflects eye-movement sensitivity to establishing reference
when an object is named (e.g., Eberhard et al., 1995); this explains the slight delay with
which effects emerge during disfluent utterances relative to fluent.
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To test how the effect of manner of delivery changed over time, we calculated the
empirical logit of the fixation proportion to the referent for each 20 ms time bin over our
0 to 800 ms window of interest, averaging across all trials in each condition separately for
subjects and for items. Model analysis revealed a reliable interaction between time and
manner of delivery, β = 1.72, SE = 0.7, t = 2.47 by subjects; β = 1.01, SE = 0.39,
t = 2.58 by items, reflecting the difference in listener commitment toward the object
mentioned by the speaker dependent on manner of delivery.
Mouse movements
Mouse movements were scored according to whether they were in the direction of
the referent or the distractor, and the absolute distance traveled (in pixels) was computed
for each 20 ms time step. Fig. 3 shows the proportion of mouse movements (in terms of
distance traveled) toward each object until 2000 ms post-noun onset. Examination of the
total distance traveled by the mouse from the time of noun-onset to the point of response
suggests an object bias dependent on manner of delivery. On fluent utterances,
participants’ cursors were more strongly attracted to the referent than the distractor,
while disfluent utterances exhibited the opposite trend. This effect was confirmed by a
model analysis on total mouse distance which revealed an interaction between object and
manner of delivery, β = 253.48, SE = 87.67, t2.89 by-subjects; β = 211.80, SE = 89.15,
t = 2.38 by-items.
The time course of mouse movements demonstrates that this difference emerged
quickly post-noun onset. On fluent utterances, mouse movements toward the referent
begin rising sharply and diverging from movements toward the distractor 400 ms
post-onset. On disfluent utterances, movements reflect a small but distinct preference
toward the distractor from around the same time, although a prominent divergence only
appears about 1500 ms post-onset (see Fig. 3). Comparing movements toward the
referent in both conditions though, it is clear that participants were more likely to move
the mouse toward the referent during fluent utterances. This effect emerged 500 ms after
onset of the noun, confirming that the disfluency affected listeners’ interpretation during
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early moments of comprehension. Following the eye-tracking analysis, we computed the
empirical logit of the proportion of distance traveled by the cursor toward the referent for
each 20 ms time interval, calculated out of the total distance traveled in either direction.
Results indicated a time by manner of delivery interaction for both subjects, β = 7.47,
SE = 2.91, t = 2.56, and items, β = 3.47, SE = 1.50, t = 2.30. As with eye movements,
participants’ mouse movements appear rapidly sensitive to the manner of delivery such
that fluent utterances are more likely to elicit movements toward objects named by the
speaker compared to disfluent utterances.
Discussion
Experiment 1 established that listeners make pragmatic inferences about a speaker’s
truthfulness dependent on the manner of delivery of the utterance. Both eye- and
mouse-tracking results indicate that this bias emerged over a time window corresponding
to early moments of utterance processing. Although the time course suggests a slight
temporal delay in mouse movements relative to the eye, this is unsurprising as it merely
reflects the role of the visual system in the planning and execution of hand motor
motions (cf. Land, Mennie, & Rusted, 1999). Accordingly, listeners’ eye movements
exhibited an initial sensitivity to the object being named during disfluent utterances, but
a corresponding effect of mouse movements toward the referent was not observed. More
importantly, the pattern of bias in the time-course of eye and mouse movements follow a
similar trend. Fluent utterances yielded an increase in fixations and mouse movements to
referent objects (i.e., participants were inclined to interpret the statement as truthful),
while the opposite trend was observed for disfluent utterances. Taken together, these
results indicate a clear effect of manner of delivery on the listener’s interpretation of the
speaker’s truthfulness. Importantly, they suggest that there is rapid integration of
pragmatic information during on-line comprehension, allowing participants to quickly
assign a non-literal meaning to the speaker’s mention of a referent. The speed with which
they do this suggests that the disfluency has already been incorporated into their model
of the speaker and has an immediate effect on their interpretation of the utterance.
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Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to test whether listeners’ pragmatic inferences about
speaker veracity are similarly sensitive to utterance-medial disfluencies. Previous
production studies on disfluency suggest that utterance-initial disfluencies are linked to
global, speech-planning issues. For example, Clark and Fox Tree (2002) observed that
ums occurred most frequently at the start of intonation units, which they attributed to
greater demands on the speech-planning mechanisms (cf. Swerts, 1998; Watanabe, 2002).
Utterance-medial filled pauses, on the other hand, tend to be associated with localized,
lexical access difficulties (e.g., Beattie & Butterworth, 1979). The design of
comprehension studies to date have largely aligned with these accounts. Studies
examining listeners’ global, metacognitive perceptions of speech such as those relating to
a speaker’s state have mainly made use of utterance-initial filled pauses (e.g., Brennan &
Williams, 1995), while those investigating listeners’ expectations relating to the semantic
content of the message have focused on the comprehension of utterance-medial pauses
(e.g., Arnold et al., 2004). Hence, we tested whether the presence of disfluency
mid-utterance affects listeners’ global judgment of whether the speaker was lying or
telling the truth. Based on findings from Experiment 1, if utterance-medial disfluencies
similarly influence listeners’ perception of deception, we would expect to see temporal
evidence of this effect reflected in participants’ early eye and mouse movements.
Method
Participants. 22 participants took part in Experiment 2, all of whom fulfilled
the same requirements as Experiment 1. None had participated in Experiment 1.
Materials. The same objects were used in Experiment 2 as in Experiment 1.
Disfluent stimuli for both experiments were recorded during the same session to ensure
consistent prosody with filler utterances. As with Experiment 1, the disfluent segment
was cross-spliced from one of the disfluent utterances into each fluent utterance to create
a disfluent counterpart. Disfluent utterances were characterized by an utterance-medial
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disfluent segment comprising a prolonged article followed by a filled pause (The treasure
is behind thee, uh . . . ). The 20 critical referents were counterbalanced across two lists
each containing ten fluent and ten disfluent utterances. Filler utterances characterized by
an utterance-medial filled pause in Experiment 1 were replaced accordingly for an
utterance-initial filled pause. The rest of the filler utterances remained the same as
Experiment 1.
Procedure. The experiment was identical in every respect to Experiment 1, with
the only difference being the disfluency position in the recordings. A post-experiment
questionnaire was again used to check whether any participants were sensitive to the
experimental manipulations. Data from one subject who guessed that the speech was
scripted was excluded from the analysis.
Results
We followed the same analysis procedures in Experiment 2 as in Experiment 1.
Data from 4 experimental trials (0.9%) on which a click was not recorded on either object
were excluded from the final dataset.
Final object click
The response distribution again suggests a global bias toward the object named by
the speaker: Participants clicked on the referent in 57% of trials and on the distractor in
43% of trials. Table 2 shows the distribution of trials on which participants clicked on
either object in each condition. As in Experiment 1, this was influenced by the speaker’s
manner of delivery, with participants more likely to click on the referent following a fluent
utterance, β = 4.06, SE = 0.60, p < .001. This replication of results from Experiment 1
suggests that listeners are sensitive to utterance-medial disfluencies when making
pragmatic inferences about a speaker’s truthfulness. To test whether there were
differences in sensitivity to utterance-initial and utterance-medial disfluencies, we
compared final object clicks for the subset of disfluent trials in both experiments.
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Participants were less likely to click on the referent following utterance-medial disfluencies,
β = −1.52, SE = 0.52, p < .005. We return to this effect in the General Discussion.
Eye movements
Fig. 4 shows the proportion of fixations to each object in each condition until
2000 ms post-noun onset. The effect of manner of delivery is reflected in eye movements
as the speech unfolded over time. During fluent utterances, fixations to the referent rose
quickly, accompanied by a corresponding decrease in looks to the distractor. Conversely,
disfluent utterances yielded the reverse pattern. The time course of events is comparable
to that observed in Experiment 1, with a fixation bias emerging 300 ms after onset of the
referent in the fluent condition, and around 600 ms post-onset in the disfluent condition.
This effect on looks to the referent over time was reflected in a significant interaction
between time and manner of delivery, for both subjects and items analyses on the time
window 0− 800 ms post-noun onset, β = 3.82, SE = 1.33, t = 2.86, and β = 2.96,
SE = 0.95, t = 5.01. A comparison of eye movements during disfluent utterances across
the two experiments found no effect of disfluency location, β = −0.26, SE = 0.32,
t = −0.81.
Mouse movements
Mouse-tracking results reveal a contrast between fluent and disfluent utterances
which corroborates the eye-tracking. Analysis of the distance traveled toward each object
as a proportion of the total distance participants moved the mouse suggests a bias due to
manner of delivery: on fluent utterances, participants’ cursors were overwhelmingly more
likely to be attracted to the referent, while disfluent utterances were characterized by
more movements toward the distractor. This difference was confirmed by a significant
interaction between object and manner of delivery, β = 475.95, SE = 96.95, t4.91 by
subjects; β = 377.35, SE = 70.33, t5.37 by items.
Fig. 5 shows the proportion of mouse movements (in terms of distance traveled)
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toward each object until 2000 ms post-noun onset. Time course examination
demonstrates that the object bias emerged rapidly after onset of the disambiguating
noun, with a referent-bias beginning 300 ms post-onset during fluent utterances, and a
distractor-bias beginning 200 ms during disfluent ones, showing that participants’ mouse
movements were quickly sensitive to the speaker’s manner of delivery in their decision of
which object to click on. As in Experiment 1, model analysis taking the empirical logit of
the proportion of distance traveled toward the referent as the dependent variable yielded
a significant interaction between time and manner of delivery, both by-subjects,
β = 11.04, SE = 2.69, t = 4.10, and by-items, β = 6.73, SE = 2.82, t = 2.39. As for eye
movements, there was no effect of disfluency location on mouse movements when
comparing Experiments 1 and 2, β = 2.22, SE = 2.90, t = 0.76.
Post-hoc analyses
We conducted two subsidiary analyses to rule out potential counterexplanations of
our findings. The first examined whether participants who knew they might be deceived
might become sensitive to the distributions of fluent/disfluent utterances, using them as
discriminative cues due to nature of the task. The second considered whether disfluencies
were understood as a general signal of uncertainty, rather than as a specific signal of
deception.2 To maximise power, we present analyses from data pooled across
Experiments 1 and 2, although we note that the findings from analyses of individual
experiments do not differ.
In order to establish whether participants learned to discriminate the disfluent
signal, we compared the trials encountered during the first third of each experiment to
those encountered during the last third. There was no effect of trial subset for either eye
movements, β = −0.09, SE = 0.30, t = −0.29, or mouse movements, β = −0.17,
SE = 0.48, t = −0.36, confirming that the results were unlikely to be a learned response
due to participants picking up on experimental contingencies over time.
2We thank a reviewer of an earlier version of this paper for these suggestions.
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To test whether disfluencies were percieved as general signals of uncertainty (cf.
Brennan & Williams, 1995), we analyzed only those items containing a disfluency,
comparing trials that resulted in a judgment of truthfulness versus deception. Figs. 6 and
7 show that participants’ eye and mouse movements demonstrate an early object bias
contingent on the final response judgment (based on the object that they ultimately
clicked on for that trial); trials which resulted in a judgment of truthfulness saw a
referent bias, while those resulting in a judgment of deception saw a distractor bias. This
difference was reflected in a time by object interaction for both fixations, β = 2.23,
SE = 0.29, t = 7.61, and mouse movements, β = 12.32, SE = 3.02, t = 4.08, confirming
that the effect of disfluency on listeners’ inferences about the speaker’s truthfulness
occurred during the initial stages of comprehension.
General Discussion
The distribution of responses in both experiments indicates an overall tendency to
believe the speaker was being truthful rather than deceptive. While this result differs
from what we might expect by chance, it follows a trend observed in previous studies on
proposition verification, which provide evidence to suggest an a priori prejudice in
listeners toward believing something to be true (e.g., Barres & Johnson-Laird, 2003;
McKinstry, Dale, & Spivey, 2008). These studies show that when asked to assess the
truth value of a statement, participants demonstrate greater difficulty in evaluating a
statement as false, suggesting an expectation regarding at least a partial adherence to the
Gricean maxim of quality on the speaker’s part. In the current study, we observed that
this pre-existing “truth-bias” still appears to bear weight even when listeners have been
told to expect a potentially non-Gricean, uncooperative speaker. Notably, this trend also
aligns with findings from actual lie detection studies, which point at a general tendency
toward perceiving speakers to be truthful rather than deceptive. For example, Vrij (2000)
found a mean of 61.5% truth judgments across nine studies analyzing listeners’ truth-lie
discrimination accuracy. This lends face value to the suggestion that the behaviour of
participants in the current study was comparable to that of judges discriminating
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between authentic truths and lies.
Extending previous findings on the effect of manner of delivery, our results show
that the way in which a message is conveyed affects a listener’s implicit judgment of the
speaker’s truthfulness. Specifically, fluent utterances bias listeners toward perceiving a
speaker to be truthful, as evidenced by increased fixations on, and mouse movements
towards, the object named by the speaker, while disfluency biases listeners toward
expecting the speaker to lie. This is consistent with previous studies on deception, which
show that listeners believe liars to be more disfluent than truth-tellers. Together, the two
experiments establish that listeners’ pragmatic interpretations are affected very quickly
by manner of delivery, whether disfluency occurs utterance-initially or mid-utterance.
Utterance-medial disfluencies resulted in fewer clicks on the named referent than
did utterance-initial disfluencies. With the caveat that this is a between-experiment
comparison, this difference appears difficult to reconcile with the production-based view
that lies are planned at the level of the message, and that any difficulty associated with
lying should therefore be best evidenced by utterance-initial disfluencies. This highlights
the complexities associated with extending production accounts of disfluency to listener
comprehension. While speakers may be disfluent in ways that are predictable, listeners’
sensitivities to disfluencies might depend on multiple factors, such as their ability to
model the mind of the speaker, or the contexts in which these cues arise. For instance, a
phrase-medial filled pause may arise as a consequence of a speaker’s search for a word;
however, in the context of anticipating a potentially dishonest speaker, the listener may
interpret the disfluency as a pragmatic cue to deception. Such a disjunct between
speakers’ productions and listeners’ perceptions of disfluencies has been recently shown in
the context of a competitive game involving deception (Loy, Rohde, & Corley, 2016).
Contrary to predictions made by traditional models of language comprehension,
temporal information from the eye- and mouse-tracking provides little evidence to suggest
that pragmatic inferences are relegated to a later, post-literal stage of processing. Rather,
our results support recent research showing that pragmatic information is extracted and
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used as an immediate constraint on utterance processing (e.g., Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004;
Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). Recall that in order to isolate effects during on-line
comprehension, our time course analyses were conducted over a window beginning from
noun-onset and ending 800 ms post-onset. Given that the average duration of critical
nouns in the experiment was 560 ms (range: 413− 776), when taking into account the
200 ms it typically takes to program an eye-movement (Matin, Shao, & Boff, 1993), it is
clear that participants’ eye and mouse movements began to exhibit this bias as the
critical linguistic input unfolded. Thus, pragmatic judgments about the veracity of the
speaker’s utterance were made on-line, and modulated immediately by the presence or
absence of a paralinguistic cue.
Building on previous studies which show that disfluency affects listeners’ on-line
expectations about the literal message content, our findings demonstrate that disfluency
modulates listeners’ pragmatic hypotheses about the speaker’s intentions simultaneously
alongside integration of lexical, semantic information. The speed with which these
hypotheses unfold is consistent with the disfluency bias observed by previous studies,
delineating an immediacy associated with judgment biases triggered by paralinguistic
information such as filled pauses. Within the framework of detecting deception, this
immediacy is also compatible with longstanding stereotypes of deceit that people seem to
retain, despite repeated findings that perceivers tend to perform at or near chance level
at overt lie detection tasks (e.g., ten Brinke, Stimson, & Carney, 2014). Given the
ingrained nature of these stereotypes, it is perhaps less surprising that such biases are
hard to overcome, whether in the context of judging deception or some other pragmatic
aspect of the utterance in question.
One question arising from the results here is why the distractor-bias observed in the
disfluent condition is smaller than the referent-bias in the fluent condition. One possible
explanation could be due to the nature of the experimental stimuli, which resulted in
fluency being made salient in the presence of disfluent utterances. Consequently,
participants may have made their judgment based on the speaker’s relative fluency
(rather than simply treating disfluency as a systematic indicator of deception), resulting
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in what could be explained as an effect of fluency in response to disfluency. However,
because participants had a pre-existing bias toward expecting the speaker to be truthful,
this created a baseline preference for the object identified by the speaker. This in turn
had to be overcome in order for participants to choose the distractor object during
utterances perceived as lies, resulting in a greater referent-bias during fluent utterances
compared to the corresponding distractor-bias during disfluent utterances. This raises the
question of whether there are probabilistic cues to deception (such as disfluency in
speech) that listeners implicitly rely on to recognize a deceptive speaker, or whether the
process is in fact modulated by contextual reasoning (such as perception of an
unexpected change in the speaker’s manner of delivery). If the latter were the case, a
disfluent utterance may be less likely to be perceived as a lie when produced by a hesitant
speaker compared to one that was consistently fluent. Exploring how listeners integrate
various sources of information when making pragmatic inferences would be a useful
avenue for future research.
The current results show that listeners make use of information in a disfluency to
draw pragmatic inferences about a speaker’s truthfulness, and more importantly, that
this information is brought to bear during initial stages of the comprehension process.
These results are relevant not only to comprehension in contexts which involve deliberate
deception, but also in the many contexts in which a listener believes a speaker to be
cooperative but must still take care to consider the status of the literal message—is it
true? Is additional meaning intended? (e.g. “your haircut looks, um, great”; “the house
for sale is, um, cozy”). In this way, we propose that the immediacy of listeners’ pragmatic
use of disfluency in evaluating an utterance is applicable broadly in language
comprehension.
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Table 1
Breakdown of filler stimuli and examples of each type.
Filler type Manipulation No. of utterances Example
Fluent None 20 The treasure is behind the giraffe.
Disfluent Prolongation 3 The treasure is behind thee. . . mushroom.
Repetition 4 The treasure is behind the- the roller skate.
Filled pause (utterance-medial) 3 The treasure is behind the, uh rooster.
Other Discourse marker 5 Okay, the treasure is behind the clothes peg.
Modal 3 The treasure could be behind the balloon.
Combination 2 Right, the treasure might be behind the caterpillar.
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Table 2
Breakdown of mouse clicks recorded on each object (referent or distractor) by manner of
delivery (fluent or disfluent) for Experiments 1 and 2. Values represent percentage of
trials.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Fluent Referent 78 87
Distractor 22 13
Disfluent Referent 37 17
Distractor 63 83
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Figure 1 . Timeline of a sample trial from the experiment
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Figure 2 . Eye-tracking results for Experiment 1: Proportion of fixations to each object
(referent or distractor) in each condition (fluent or disfluent), from 0 to 2000 ms
post-noun onset, calculated out of the total sum of fixations for each 20 ms time bin.
Shaded areas represent ±1 standard error of the mean. Note that proportions do not sum
to 1 because some fixations fell outside of either object.
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Figure 3 . Mouse-tracking results for Experiment 1: Proportion of cumulative distance
traveled toward each object (referent or distractor) in each condition (fluent or disfluent),
from 0 to 2000 ms post-noun onset. Proportions were calculated out of the total
cumulative distance participants moved the mouse from noun-onset until that time bin.
Shaded areas represent ±1 standard error of the mean.
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Figure 4 . Eye-tracking results for Experiment 2: Proportion of fixations to each object
(referent or distractor) in each condition (fluent or disfluent), from 0 to 2000 ms
post-noun onset, calculated out of the total sum of fixations for each 20 ms time bin.
Shaded areas represent ±1 standard error of the mean. Note that proportions do not sum
to 1 because some fixations fell outside of either object.
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Figure 5 . Mouse-tracking results for Experiment 2: Proportion of cumulative distance
traveled toward each object (referent or distractor) in each condition (fluent or disfluent),
from 0 to 2000 ms post-noun onset. Proportions were calculated out of the total
cumulative distance participants moved the mouse from noun-onset until that time bin.
Shaded areas represent ±1 standard error of the mean.
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Figure 6 . Eye-tracking results for subset of disfluent trials from Experiments 1 and 2:
Proportion of fixations to each object (referent or distractor) broken down by response
judgment (truth or lie), from 0 to 2000 ms post-noun onset, calculated out of the total
sum of fixations for each 20 ms time bin. Shaded areas represent ±1 standard error of the
mean.
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Figure 7 . Mouse-tracking results for subset of disfluent trials from Experiments 1 and 2:
Proportion of cumulative distance traveled toward each object (referent or distractor)
broken down by response judgment (truth or lie), from 0 to 2000 ms post-noun onset.
Proportions were calculated out of the total cumulative distance participants moved the
mouse from noun-onset until that time bin. Shaded areas represent ±1 standard error of
the mean.
